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Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that many people hold personal memories for events that they no 
longer believe occurred. This study examines the reasons that people provide for choosing to 
reduce autobiographical belief in vividly recollected autobiographical memories. A body of 
nonbelieved memories provided by 374 individuals was reviewed to develop a qualitatively 
derived categorization system. The final scheme consisted of 8 major categories (in descending 
order of mention): social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general memory 
beliefs, internal event features, consistency with external evidence, views of self/others, and 
personal motivation; and numerous sub-categories. Independent raters coded the reports and 
judged the primary reason that each person provided for withdrawing belief. The nature of each 
category, frequency of category endorsement, category overlap, and phenomenological ratings 
are presented, following which links to related literature and implications are discussed. This 
study documents that a wide variety of recollective and non-recollective sources of information 
influence decision-making about the occurrence of autobiographical events. 
 
Keywords: autobiographical memory, autobiographical belief, nonbelieved memory, decision 
making 
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Reasons for Withdrawing Belief in Vivid Autobiographical Memories 
Remembering the past is fraught with uncertainty. People frequently have experiences 
that remind them of the fallibility of memory. They forget where they left their keys, have 
difficulty recalling the names of people they just met, and their loved ones frequently remind 
them of the actual details of shared experiences. 
In part due to the awareness that autobiographical memory can be inaccurate, and in part 
because at times they face contradicting information, people sometimes must decide whether a 
mental representation is indicative of actual prior experience, or if it originated in some other 
process (e.g., dream, another’s experience; Johnson & Raye, 1981). While a large body of work 
examines the circumstances under which false memories for non-occurring events develop 
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Mazzoni & Scoboria, 2007), the converse case in which existing 
autobiographical memories are re-appraised and ‘edited-out’ of memory are less frequently 
studied. However, cases in which people come to the decision to reduce their belief or release 
ownership of memories are important in that they show that ongoing editing is characteristic of 
even the most vivid and closely held autobiographical memories. 
In this paper we focus on one such phenomenon, that of nonbelieved memories (Mazzoni, 
Scoboria & Harvey, 2010). Nonbelieved memories are memories about personal events that were 
once believed to reflect genuine experiences. However, the belief that the memory reflects a 
genuine occurrence was somehow challenged, and the rememberer chose to stop believing that 
the memory was true. Despite the loss of autobiographical belief, the mental representation 
associated with the event continues to be experienced much like other believed memories. 
Mazzoni et al. (2010) asked individuals claiming memories that they no longer believed 
to describe their memory, the reasons that they chose to withdraw belief in the memory, and to 
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rate phenomenological characteristics associated with the memory. The participants also 
described and rated age-matched believed memories and believed-not-remembered events (e.g., 
family stories). Nonbelieved and believed memories were rated similar in key characteristics 
associated with recollection (e.g., perceptual details, sense of re-experiencing), and ratings for 
both exceeded those of believed-not-remembered events. Nonbelieved memories were rated 
lower than believed memories on event complexity, event significance, and connectedness to 
other events in memory, suggesting differences in attributions about the personal importance and 
embeddedness within autobiographical memory. Subsequent studies have extended these 
findings, showing that this phenomenological pattern replicates and also can be obtained 
following a variety of experimental procedures (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni, Clark & Nash, 
2014; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). 
Thus, these are memories that their owners decide are false, despite their recollective 
qualities. In this paper, we investigate the reasons that individuals provide for having chosen to 
alter autobiographical belief for a memory. Previous studies have documented memory 
verification strategies when personal memories are held with uncertainty. This might happen 
when the memory does not feel coherent, or the memory might conflict with other 
autobiographical knowledge such as the recollections of others who witnessed the event 
(Arbuthnott, Kealy, & Ylioja, 2008). When subjects recalled childhood memories of 
questionable accuracy and then described how they would verify the memories, the two most 
frequently endorsed strategies involved seeking information from family members or cognitive 
approaches such as trying to recall further details (Kemp & Burt, 2006; Wade & Garry, 2005). 
More recently it has been shown that selection of memory verification strategy depends in part 
on perceptions of the cost and reliability of available strategies (Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014).  
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The current study goes further and investigates the reasons that people provide for having 
actually chosen to alter autobiographical belief for vivid memories. Nonbelieved memories are 
characterized by the choice to relinquish belief, which distinguishes them from other phenomena 
such as inaccessibility or forgetting. Thus the reasons for choosing to relinquish belief are a 
prima facie component of the phenomenon. The examination of the reasons provided for altering 
belief in memories has the potential to inform more general views on the elements that contribute 
to decision making about memories and memory editing processes. 
To situate the phenomenon, we begin with a brief overview on decision making and 
autobiographical memory. We then describe the development of a scheme for coding the reasons 
people provide for altering belief in their memories, provide data on the nature of the resulting 
categories, and link these categories with the literature. 
Making Decisions about Memory 
We begin from the assertion that the labeling of mental representations as ‘remembered’ 
reflects decision-making processes (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Rubin, 2006). Thus, 
remembering is inherently metacognitive in nature – the products of remembering are monitored 
in various ways, and control is exerted when memory reports are output (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002; Nelson & Narens, 1990). There is growing evidence that distinct metacognitive judgments 
contribute to the experience of remembering (Brewer, 1996; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; 
Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Rubin, 2006; Scoboria et al., in press). One judgment involves 
recollection. Mental representations tend to be labeled as ‘memories’ or as ‘recollected’ when 
associated with vivid imagery and a sense of re-experiencing the past (Tulving, 1983; 
Moskovitch, 2012). The Reality Monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981) proposes that 
memories are differentiated from other mental representations (e.g., dreams) by the relative 
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contributions of perceptual versus other cognitive operations that are experienced at the time of 
remembering. The Basic Systems model (Rubin, 2006) proposes that recollection is an appraisal 
that is influenced by input from various component cognitive systems. 
Another key non-recollective judgment made about mental representations for personal 
past events is autobiographical belief. This is the subjective judgment that an event genuinely 
occurred in the past (see Scoboria et al., in press, for a review). Autobiographic belief judgments 
are influenced by multiple inputs, and are made in the presence or absence of recollection. Some 
factors known to influence autobiographical belief include inference from necessary truth (e.g., 
most people believe that they were born), population base-rate information, event plausibility, 
and credible social feedback (Hart & Schooler, 2006; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, 
Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012; Shtulman, 2009). 
One implication of such a distinction is that the two constructs are dissociable. While 
events that are recollected are also believed to have occurred in many instances, recollection and 
autobiographical belief do not necessarily coincide. For example, in the case of believed- not-
remembered events (such as non-recollected family stories that are believed to be true) and false 
autobiographical beliefs (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 
2007), autobiographical belief exceeds recollection. In the case of nonbelieved memories, 
recollection exceeds the strength of autobiographical belief. 
Scoboria et al. (in press) presented data supportive of a strong dissociation between 
distinct recollection and autobiographical belief latent constructs. In light of such a distinction, it 
becomes pertinent to examine what processes influence autobiographical belief. Researching the 
circumstances which lead people to question autobiographical belief in the presence of vivid 
recollection has the potential to reveal factors that contribute to the maintenance of 
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autobiographical belief and also to elucidate processes that contribute to the editing of memory. 
When the occurrence or accuracy of an event is brought into question, various decisions 
may follow. Following false memory implantation procedures, some people remember nothing, 
most endorse autobiographical belief without recollection, and a sizeable minority report a 
recollective memory (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1996; Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz & Lynn, 1999; 
Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). In other words, the procedures used in such studies can induce belief 
alone or belief plus recollection. Contested memories (Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001) are an 
example of the converse to nonbelieved memories, in which the rememberer chooses to defend 
their memory in response to feedback that an event did not occur (see also, Ikier, Tekcan, Gülgöz, 
& Küntay, 2003; Küntay, Gülgöz, & Tekcan, 2004; Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2006). Smeets, 
Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & Merckelbach (2009) report an interesting example of excessive memory 
defense. Thus, belief is sometimes maintained when the truth status of a memory is challenged. 
In other cases autobiographical belief is reduced or relinquished. Nonbelieved memories show 
that the truth status of vivid, personally significant memories is subject to updating. 
In this study, we examined reports provided by individuals claiming nonbelieved 
memories regarding the actual reasons that they chose to cease believing their memories. We 
used a qualitative approach to identify and enumerate the various reasons provided. The study 
was intentionally not hypothesis driven, because the approach emphasized examining reports 
without strong assumptions as to what might appear in them. We did incorporate some findings 
from prior literature in the process. Based on Mazzoni et al. (2010), we expected to identify 
social feedback, external evidence, challenges to the plausibility of events, and mention of 
dreaming. We also anticipated identifying social feedback and evaluation of internal memorial 
evidence based on work on memory verification (Wade et al., 2014). 
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Method 
The data was collected over a two year period. On registering in an on-line participant 
pool system, students completed about 40 screening questions for various studies. Among them 
was a Y/N question which asked, “Do you have an event you stopped believing happened to you, 
but you have not stopped remembering?” Those responding yes could register for the study. 
Participants who opted to take part completed an online inventory in which they first 
described one nonbelieved memory. They described their memory for the event, indicated their 
age when the event occurred, described the reasons that they stopped believing in their memory, 
and indicated their age when they stopped believing the memory. They then rated the event on 
autobiographical belief (2 items; belief , belief strength), recollection (2 items; memory, memory 
strength), personal plausibility, general plausibility, and rated 21 phenomenological and 
metamemorial characteristics prior research associated with remembering on 7 points scales. The 
autobiographical belief, recollection, and plausibility items were those reported in Scoboria et al. 
(in press; Study 1), in which each scale demonstrated good validity. The 21 additional items 
were the same as those used by Mazzoni et al. (2010), who drew them from related literature on 
self-reported memory characteristics (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Johnson et al., 
1988; Rubin et al., 2003). The items queried reexperiencing (reliving, mental time travel, 
averaged), perceptual qualities (vision, auditory, touch, smell/taste), spatial characteristics 
(location, arrangement of people, arrangement of objects, averaged), temporal characteristics 
(time of event, length), emotion (feelings and now, feeling intensity, positive feeling, negative 
feeling), completeness of the representation, narrative coherence, subjective importance of the 
mental representation, prior conversations about the event, and connectedness to other memories.  
The description and rating of the nonbelieved memory was followed by the selection, 
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description and rating of a self-selected believed memory and then a believed-not-remembered 
event. These events were selected after all data on the nonbelieved memory was gathered. These 
events are not the focus of this paper and the data are not reported further. The reasons provided 
for choosing to alter belief in the memory are the primary data examined here. 
Participants 
The nonbelieved memories included in the current study were collected from 374 
students (72% female; Mage = 21.07, SD = 4.04, range 17 to 46). All reports included in the 
dataset met the definition of nonbelieved memory provided above. A majority of the reports are 
not previously reported, and 187 reports are the same as those analyzed in Scoboria et al. (in 
press, Study 2). The focus of that paper is on the conceptual distinction between autobiographical 
belief and recollection; the reasons for altering belief were not examined there. 
Development and Validation of the Coding Scheme 
We used a qualitative approach to develop the scheme for classifying the reasons for no 
longer believing in memories, using primarily a data driven approach, but also informed by some 
preceding findings. We began with the basic categories reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010): social 
feedback, implausibility, acquisition of contradictory evidence, reference to dreaming. The 
second author read the transcripts to identify all themes present and generated an initial 
classification. In this phase the classification used verbatim rationales provided by participants 
wherever possible. In the rare instances in which the response was insufficiently specific, 
categorization was based to some extent on inference. The first and second authors then refined 
the categories and coding strategies (e.g., deciding when to rely on explicit statements, when to 
allow for inference), and developed guidelines for identifying the main reason for withdrawing 
belief in the memory when multiple rationales were given by the participants. The initial 
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classifications were clustered into major categories and sub-categories, and the process of sorting 
responses and defining categories was repeated over a number of iterations. Eight major 
categories and 25 sub-categories were included in the final scheme (see the results below). 
We trained two assistants in the use of the scheme and provided a manual which included 
the categories and criteria for distinguishing amongst categories. We trained the raters by 
defining nonbelieved memories, describing each category, and discussing strategies for deciding 
on the presence of categories in a transcript. The second author and the assistants coded practice 
events, after which each assistant coded 15 practice events separately. After group discussion 
and refinement of the manual, the assistants rated 50 practice events independently to verify the 
scheme. Using the final scheme, one assistant and the second author rated the entire body of 
transcripts independently. Agreement rates were high for the individual categories and sub-
categories (kappas ranged from .82 to .99). Disagreements were resolved via discussion. 
Results 
Reasons for Withdrawing Belief from Memories 
 In this section we describe the resulting categories and sub-categories. Category names, 
definitions, and brief quotations from the reports that exemplify the category are reported in 
Table 1. In total, 787 instances of reasons for withdrawing belief were mentioned by the 374 
participants, and there were 671 unique mentions of each major category. The difference in total 
mentions and the total for major categories is because participants sometimes mentioned multiple 
sub-categories within a major category. Tables 2 and 3 provide additional details on the 
frequency of endorsement of major and sub-categories, including rates at which categories were 
judged to be the primary reason for withdrawing belief in the memory. Table 4 provides 
information on overlap between the primary reason for withdrawing belief and the other major 
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categories. Discussion of the nature and implications of categories and links to the literature are 
presented in the general discussion.  
Major Category: Social feedback 
The most frequently mentioned reason for withdrawing belief in a memory was social 
feedback (or lack thereof). This category was defined by the participant mentioning social 
exchange as contributing to their choice to alter belief in the memory. Statements of this type 
were provided by 52.8% of individuals, and this category was judged to be the primary reason 
for altering belief for 42.2% of participants. Social feedback was the also most diverse category, 
with 12 distinct sub-categories. The sub-categories were organized into three groups: 
 Direct social contradiction (7 sub-categories). These sub-categories included cases in 
which another person(s) provided direct feedback contradicting event details and/or the 
occurrence of the event. They included: (SO1) being told that the event did not occur (n=78); 
(SO2) being told that the event happened differently (n=37); (SO3) being told that the event is 
impossible (n=28); (SO4) being told that the event is not likely to have occurred (n=10); (SO5) 
being told that the event happened to someone else (n=10); (SO6) nonverbal feedback from 
another that the individual interprets as indicating that the event did not occur (n=10); and, (SO7) 
being told that they were not present (physically or mentally) to witness the event (n=4). 
 Lack of corroboration (3 sub-categories). These sub-categories involved instances in 
which confirmation could not be obtained from others. They included: (SO8) another person 
could not confirm the event when asked (n=46); (SO9) corroboration was never sought from 
others (n=11); (SO10) a key person was not available to ask (n=2). These represent instances in 
which an inability to acquire social feedback influenced decision-making about the memory. 
 Socially motivated invalidation (2 sub-categories). These sub-categories included cases 
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in which the social feedback appeared to be related to the motivations of those who provided (or 
did not provide) the feedback. In other words, the person who provided the feedback may have 
had a reason to encourage the subject to stop believing in the event. The sub-categories included: 
(SO11) being pressured by another person to not discuss the event (n=10); and (SO12) others 
refusing to provide information when asked (n=3). Events in this group suggest cases in which 
the other individual had a motivation to avoid personal implication, to avoid implicating another 
person, or there was a secret within a group regarding admitting that an event occurred. These 
cases indicate that people sometimes alter belief in memories based on others’ motives. 
Major Category: Event Plausibility 
This category was comprised of instances in which events were appraised in terms of 
their reality status. Such assessments could be subjective or objective. In the case of subjective 
appraisals (PL1), the individual explicitly concluded that the event is either impossible, 
implausible (i.e., it is not likely to have occurred), or illogical (i.e., it simply does not make 
sense). Objective appraisals of implausibility (PL2) relied upon unbiased, impartial, commonly 
known and often scientifically accepted axioms of reality (e.g., encounters with cultural figures 
such as Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy, ability to fly unaided, etc.). 
This category was the second most frequently referenced, by 35.4% of the sample, and 
was judged as the primary reason for withdrawing belief in the memory for 19.5% of the sample.  
Statements of implausibility were made by 119 participants and 57 described an event that was 
objectively implausible without stating that as the reason for their decision. This reinforces that 
the event plausibility is an important component of the processing of autobiographical memories. 
Major Category: Alternative Attributions 
This category was comprised of event attributions (i.e. sources other than ‘real life’ 
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experience) that were noted when describing the event. Of the sample, 28.9% made such a 
reference, and it was judged as the primary reason for altering belief in 8.8% of cases. The 
category was comprised of four sub-categories. The first (AA1; n=74) involved mental 
representations originating when asleep (i.e., dreams, nightmares). The second (AA2; n=33) 
involved attributions to mental fabrications that occurred when ‘awake’, such as imagination, 
fantasy, and daydreaming. The third (AA3; n=12) included attributions to other mental states 
(i.e., hallucination, intoxication, exhaustion, confusion, déjà vu).The final (AA4; n=4) involved 
confusions between external sources (e.g., television show, books, etc.) and actual experience. 
Compared to the frequency with which information that fit this category was mentioned, 
this category was infrequently judged to be the primary reason for withdrawing belief. One 
explanation is that these are reattributions which occur after the event is challenged by another 
source of evidence. It follows that source reattribution may directly support relinquishing belief 
in the memory, or may result from a need to justify the decision to reduce belief. 
Major Category: General Beliefs Regarding Memory and Memory Ability 
This category included general metamemory beliefs that shaped decisions about the 
occurrence of the event. Of the sample, 17.9% made reference to material that fit this category, 
and for 6.4% of the sample this was judged to be the primary reason for altering belief in the 
memory. This category was divided into three sub-categories. The first sub-category involved 
beliefs about memory in general and memory during childhood (GB1; n=36). Examples include: 
memories cannot occur before a certain age, a memory is too vivid considering the age that it 
occurred, and childhood memories are unreliable. The second sub-category involved beliefs 
about the integrity of memory (GB2; n=30). Examples include beliefs that memories can be false 
or (re)constructed, that events can be confused with other events, and that memories should be 
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clear if important. The third and final sub-category involved the belief that memorable events 
should have an ongoing influence on current behavior (GB3; n=5). 
Major Category: Internal Features of Event Representations 
This category was characterized by references to internal memorial characteristics. Here, 
respondents indicated that some feature of the internal representation led them to question the 
memory. These included references to specific sensorial, contextual, and emotional features 
(e.g., people, objects, perceptual qualities, vividness, location, coherence) and more general 
assessments of the representation (e.g., feelings that the memory was odd or unusual). 
Statements fitting this category were made by 16.3% (N = 61) of the sample and the category 
was judged to be the primary reason for altering belief in 7.2% of the sample. Thus individuals 
sometimes reported scrutiny of internal features as a basis for questioning the memory. 
Major Category: External Evidence 
This category included cases in which the individual actively sought or was confronted 
with external evidence that invalidated the memory, and the evidence was not obtained via social 
exchange. This category was noted by 10.7% of the sample and was judged to be the primary 
reason in 7.2% of cases. There were two sub-categories: (1) instances in which disconfirming 
evidence was obtained (EE1; n=24), and, (2) instances in which confirming evidence could not 
be obtained (EE2; n=17). Examples of (dis)confirming evidence included photographs, videos, 
other documentation, current physical or mental condition (e.g., lack of a scar), or through new 
knowledge concerning another person’s actions or condition at the time of the event. 
Major Category: Notions of Self/Others  
This category was comprised of instances in which incompatibility between the event (or 
event features) and the individual’s self-concept, or their concept of another person(s), 
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influenced the decision to alter belief. Individuals made reference to thoughts, behaviors, speech, 
preferences, other enduring characteristics, occupation, etc. which influenced their thinking as to 
whether the memory was consistent with their view of themselves or of others involved at the 
time that they decided to alter belief. This category was endorsed by 12.0% of the sample and 
was judged as the primary reason for withdrawing belief for 6.4%. The first sub-category 
involved (in)compatibility with views of the self (SO1; n=17) and the second (in)compatibility 
with views of others (SO2; n=30). This indicates that people sometimes choose to withdraw 
belief in memories because an even is judged to be inconsistent with views of self or others. 
Major Category: Personal Motivation 
This category was defined by instances in which individuals expressed a desire to not 
remember the event, and claimed success in altering belief that the memory reflected a genuine 
occurrence. Here, participants expressed a personal motivation to invalidate the memory for 
some form of self-benefit. This category was mentioned by 4.3% of the sample, and was judged 
to be the primary reason for withdrawing belief in the memory in 1.1% of cases.  
This category shows that people sometimes seek to alter belief in memories due to 
personal motivation to not remember. While individuals report success in altering belief, they 
continue to experience vivid recollection. In order for events to be coded into this group, it must 
have been apparent that the individual was motivated to accomplish some form of self-benefit or 
threat-protection that was self-driven. This category does not include social exchange (which is 
discussed above), although it does allude to social conformity to the extent that the choice to 
conform appears to remain self-driven. These events are either explicitly stated or inferred to be 
somehow threatening or uncomfortable to the rememberer, and such reports indicate that the 
person claims to have succeeded in altering belief in the memory through their efforts. 
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This category is not to be confused with the instances described above in which another 
person is motivated to shape the rememberer’s recall. The events in this category were 
characterized by discomfort at the prospect of recall and/or dislike of the content of the memory. 
The desire to avoid the memory was a theme, and hence there may be useful parallels with the 
literatures on memory for negative and traumatic events. Participants made statements such as, “I 
pushed it from my mind” and “I did not want to believe that that happened.” Of further note, 
only events for which the individual claimed success in altering belief in the memory were 
included in the study. Memories which individuals wished that they did not believe did not meet 
the definition of a nonbelieved memory are not included in this dataset. 
Category Overlap 
Frequency of unique mentions of categories is enumerated in Tables 2 and 3.  
Considering overlap between major categories, of the sample, 146 provided two, 50 three, 13 
four, and 3 five reasons. Overlap between the primary reason for withdrawing belief and the 
other major categories is provided in Table 4. Overlap with the Alternative Attributions category 
is discussed above, and is not repeated here. The most frequent overlap occurred between the 
Social and Plausibility categories (9.6% of the sample). Social also overlapped with General 
Beliefs (6.7%), Internal (3.7%), and External (2.9%). Plausibility overlapped with General 
Beliefs (6.7%), External (4.0%) and Self/Other (3.5%). There were just four notable groupings of 
three categories: Social/Internal/Alternative (N=7), Social/Plausibility/Alternative (N=10), 
External/Plausibility/Alternative (N = 6), and Plausibility/General Belief/Alternative (N = 11). 
Subjective Event Ratings 
The participants rated the nonbelieved memory using the self-report items listed above. 
We contrasted ratings across the categories, excluding Motivation (due to few observations) and 
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Alternative Attributions (due to high overlap). These contrasts are exploratory and are primarily 
reported for the sake of completeness. We examined the magnitude of differences between 
categories and overlap in confidence intervals between the groups, and report group differences 
for which the effect was statistically moderate or larger. For most items there were no notable 
differences. The events in the Plausibility category were rated lower on general plausibility than 
all other categories (Mdiff = 1.59; d = 0.66) and lower on personal plausibility for all categories 
but Self/Other (Mdiff = 1.52; d = 0.70), which speaks to the validity of the Plausibility category. 
Only two other contrasts were of note. The rehearsal item received higher ratings in the Social 
than the Internal category (Mdiff = .84, d = 0.43), and the negative emotion item receive higher 
ratings in the Self/Other than the External category (Mdiff = .89; d = 0.47).  
Discussion  
 The most striking result in this study is the sheer variety of reasons provided as informing 
the decision to alter belief in vivid memories. The reasons originated from internal and external 
information, were based in personal motivations and the motivations of others, and depended on 
the presence or absence of external evidence. The most frequent reasons were social influence, 
and event plausibility, both external in origin. These results support the argument made by 
Scoboria et. al. (in press) that judgments about the occurrence of events are influenced by many 
different sources of information. Links with the literature and implications are now discussed.  
External evidence and remembering 
The external evidence category reflects that fact that many different types of information 
can serve as evidence for or against the occurrence of events. There is an interesting literature on 
the use of memory aids, such as photographs and diaries, to cue recall, which will not be 
reviewed here. We will make the point that the recording and retention of memory aids is 
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frequently intentional. For example, Catal and Fitzgerald (2004) describe a woman who kept a 
detailed diary for decades so as to avoid conflicts within her family as to what ‘actually’ 
occurred (interestingly, this is also the use of a memory aid to facilitate a personal aim). 
It is not surprising that encountering evidence about events can lead to the withdrawal of 
belief. Photographs may serve as concrete evidence that events occurred in a particular manner 
(Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Much of the work on the impact of photos on 
autobiographical memory has been in the context of false memory formation. Studies have 
shown that photos facilitate false memory formation under some conditions (Wade et al., 2002; 
Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004; see Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012, for 
exceptions). The provision of doctored video evidence can lead to rapid inferences that false 
events must have occurred (Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009).  
The fact that some individuals described seeking information (sometimes finding it, and 
sometimes not) can be construed in different ways. First, this might be viewed as a search for 
information that might in itself directly verify the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of the event. 
That is, the information acquired may directly lead to a decision that the event happened/did not 
happen. Second, and not exclusively, searching for evidence might be thought of as an effort to 
cue additional remembering. While specific event-related evidence may not be located, other 
relevant evidence might be encountered. Lindsay et al. (2004) used such a cue when presenting a 
class photo along with a suggestion that a false event purportedly occurred. The current findings 
also show that it is not only locating confirmatory evidence that challenges autobiographical 
belief, but the failure to locate evidence can do the same. 
The social basis of remembering 
The predominance of social input as an influence on judgments about the occurrence of 
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events is consistent with arguments that remembering is social in nature. Bartlett (1932) 
emphasized the social context of remembering. Bluck, Alea, Habermas and Rubin (2005), 
Hyman (1994), and Pillemer (1998) have variously argued that one of the functions of 
autobiographical memory  is to serve social goals, such as nurturing relationships, transmitting 
knowledge, and informing others about personal experiences. Other views emphasize that it is 
difficult to separate retrieval, the conversion of retrieved material into verbal behavior, and the 
social aspects of retrieval contexts (Tulving, 1983; Blank, 2009), thus  rendering much of what is 
studied under the rubric of memory as social in nature. Hirst and Echterhoff (2012) emphasize 
the communicative functions of remembering, and review ways in which what is recalled is 
affected by the purpose of remembering, with whom remembering occurs, and the dynamics of 
social exchange when remembering occurs. Sutton, Harris, Keil and Barnier (2010) argue that 
research on collaborative and transactive memory supports the proposition that cognitive 
processing may be extended beyond the individual to groups. An implication is that the 
maintenance and updating of individual beliefs about the occurrence of events are frequently 
subjected to input from members of the social groups within which people move. 
 These findings are also consistent with research showing the influence of social variables 
on remembering. For example, the credibility of messages and of individuals who are viewed as 
knowledgeable about events can influence the retrieval of genuine memories and the 
development of false beliefs and memories (e.g., Brown, Coman, & Hirst, 2009; Hyman & 
Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni, Lombardo, Malvagia, & Loftus, 1999). Work on memory verification 
also points to the reliance on social input to validate memories (Wade & Garry, 2005). People 
rely on social input even when the reliability of the informant is questionable. For example, 
people sometimes ‘fill in the blanks’ in memories for alcohol induced blackouts by relying on 
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other people who were also drinking to reconstruct (or fabricate) what occurred (Nash & 
Takarangi, 2011). When individuals report reduced confidence in the accuracy of memories, they 
most frequently cite lack of social verification as the reason for their uncertainty (Arbuthnott et 
al., 2008). Wade et al. (2014) reported that individuals consider social verification to be a 
reliable and low cost method relative to other memory verification strategies. 
When Someone Else is Motivated for You to Remember it Differently 
We found that social influence can also originate from individuals not wanting others to 
remember. This points to the fact that people sometimes challenge other’s memories due to their 
own motivations.  People vary in their motivations for challenging others’ memories. An 
example is when someone recalls an event that involves another person being aware of 
something undesirable occurring in the past (e.g. abuse), and the other person invalidates the 
memory or refuses to discuss the issue. This other person’s motivation may be to not recall the 
experience themselves, or to protect themselves or another person.  
Work on suggestibility indicates that the motivations of others may serve to shape 
remembering. An example is false confessions, in which an interrogator may be motivated to 
obtain particular version of the past (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), which requires also devaluing 
whatever memory is present for what did in fact occur. Related issues are a play in the case of 
retractors of false memories of childhood abuse (see Ost & Nunkoosing, 2009). These are cases 
in which individuals came to remember childhood events during psychotherapy, however at a 
later time (perhaps when alleged abusers deny that abuse occurred) they come to view this event 
as false. Here the motivations of the therapist as well as the motivations of the accused may 
impinge on the decisions made about the occurrence of the event. The point is that individuals 
may at times, intentionally or unintentionally, take advantage of the susceptibility of 
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autobiographical belief to social influence in order to advance personal agendas by challenging 
others’ personal beliefs about the past.  
Objective and Perceived Event Plausibility Play a Central Role in Remembering 
The emergence of plausibility as a basis for altering belief in vivid memories reinforces 
views that event plausibility plays a key role in the processing of event representations. 
Plausibility has been proposed to influence memory-editing processes (Ghetti & Alexander, 
2004; Lampinen & Odegaard, 2006), and may be thought of as constraining the degree to which 
events can be believed to be genuine (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). When 
plausibility is low, false beliefs and memories are unlikely to develop (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 
1997), which is likely due to rejection of the event (Mazzoni, 2007). Only small increases in 
plausibility are needed to foment the development of false autobiographical beliefs (Mazzoni, 
Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Shapero, 2012). 
In other words, if Santa Claus is known to be real encountering him is plausible. On 
learning that Santa is not literally real, the ground truth of a memory for an encounter with Santa 
is undermined. In this case the presupposing conditions which support belief are eliminated. 
However, while the removal of plausibility leads to the withdrawal of belief in the occurrence, it 
does not affect in the same way the strength of the recollective quality of the mental simulation. 
Internal Evidence and Memory 
The scrutiny of internal features as a basis for altering belief in the occurrence of an event 
is consistent with the view that mental representations tend to be labeled as memories when 
associated with sufficient levels of vivid perceptual imagery, contextual information, emotional 
content, and a sense of re-experiencing the past (Brewer, 1996; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & 
Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2001). Theoretical views proposing that the 
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classification of mental representations as memories reflects decision making processes argue 
that various sources of information are combined to reach the judgment that a mental experience 
is a sufficiently veridical representation of prior experience (Johnson & Raye, 1981). The 
internal features category reinforces the idea that memory representations judged at one time to 
be adequate may be re-appraised as inadequate at a later time. This re-appraisal might occur in 
light of other information that leads to altering the threshold for judging a representation to be a 
memory. The characteristics of the memory may not have changed at all, but the criterion for 
judging them as adequate can be altered by the new information. New information (accurate or 
inaccurate) may lead to changes in the threshold by which the event is judged to reflect genuine 
occurrence. Alternatively, the memory representation may change over time in any number of 
ways, which may lead to it being reappraised due to change in any of these qualities. 
Source Monitoring and Reattribution of the Source of Memories. 
The main theoretical approach that views memories as attributions is source monitoring. 
The source monitoring framework (SMF) proposes that the source of memories is not directly 
encoded, but instead is inferred at the time of recall (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). The 
current findings are consistent with the idea that mental representations may be attributed to one 
source and later reattributed to another source in light of new information. Most of the re-
attributions identified here are examples of internal-internal monitoring (e.g., reattributing a 
memory as a dream). A small number reported internal-external misattributions, for example 
reattributing their memory to a television show. 
People are sometimes uncertain about the source of mental representations. Shortly after 
waking, people sometimes report difficulty resolving whether vivid images originate from 
dreams or experiences (Kemp & Burt, 2006). People can be uncertain as to whether their 
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memories for childhood events originate from their own experience versus from family stories or 
from photographs that they have seen (Mazzoni, Chiesi, & Primi, 2000). Source misattribution is 
frequently cited as the means by which imagined mental representations are later labeled as 
memories reflecting genuine experiences (Lindsay, 2008). Arguably, all of the reasons examined 
in this paper are potentially elements that could lead to the reattribution of a memory. 
The emergence of this category is a reminder of two key points that are made in the SMF: 
(1) that people are aware that the attribution of mental representations to a particular source is 
unreliable and therefore at times subject to revision; and, (2) that people sometimes actively 
engage decision-making processes when considering whether a mental representation reflects 
actual past experiences (termed ‘systematic processing’ in the source monitoring framework). 
General Beliefs about Memory Shape Decisions about Specific Memories 
This category shows that people may base decisions to withdraw belief in memories on 
general metacognitive beliefs about of memory. This category is consistent with arguments that 
general beliefs and knowledge about memory and remembering influence memory output. 
Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) discuss a number of general beliefs, such as the belief that it is 
impossible to retrieve memories from before a certain age (the so-called infantile amnesia), that 
memories are more detailed than imaginings, that images that enter awareness with ease and 
fluency are likely to be memories, and distinctive events are likely to be recalled. Beliefs about 
childhood amnesia and beliefs about the unreliability of early memory do influence memory 
reporting (Maloniski & Lynn, 1999; Strange, Wade, & Hayne, 2008). 
The finding that some individuals no longer believe their memory because they have 
learned that memory is reconstructive, or that false memories can occur, points to another type of 
memory belief: beliefs about memory that are acquired from experts (e.g., psychology instructors 
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providing information about infantile amnesia, false memory, etc.). Little is known about how 
such information influences the dynamics of everyday remembering. It is also interesting that, 
although we actively looked for them, there were few references to memory ability (e.g., beliefs 
that one’s memory was generally poor, or that ability had declined). There is ample evidence that 
beliefs about memory function are a reliable individual difference variable that predicts memory 
performance (Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990). The current sample may simply have not 
reported such beliefs, as they might not be salient unless directly queried and instead operate in 
the background to shape performance. It is also possible that the current sample of younger 
adults may not have emphasized beliefs about memory ability when making decisions. The 
literature documents that belief in memory decline increases with age, and that older adults are 
more likely to attribute memory failures to decline in ability rather than situational factors 
(Lineweaver, Berger, & Hertzog, 2009; Pansky, Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pearlman-Avnion, 2009). 
While such beliefs may be less pertinent in this sample, these examples are interesting because it 
has been shown that such beliefs predict underperformance on memory tasks in elderly 
individuals (Hertzog, McGuire, & Lineweaver, 1998; Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003). 
This leaves the question as to whether nonbelieved memories, namely, those resulting from 
beliefs about memory ability, are more likely in older individuals.  
Views of Self and of Others Shape Remembering 
Various researchers have argued that autobiographical memory serves self-related 
functions (Bluck & Levine, 1998; Pillemer, 1998). Evidence supports the assertion that 
autobiographical memory contributes to perceptions of the self as consistent over time (Bluck, 
Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). Perceptions of self-inconsistency can threaten current views of 
self-coherence, resulting in discrepant memories being rendered not readily accessible 
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(McAdams, 2001). Other approaches propose that retrieval is driven by current self-goals, 
leading to goal consistent information being more accessible than goal-inconsistent information 
(Conway, Singer, & Tagani, 2004; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). What our data show is that 
sometimes memories are retrieved that are inconsistent with current self-views. For example, a 
memory may have been consistent with past goals and hence frequently retrieved, rehearsed, and 
rendered highly accessible. Thus inconsistency with self-goals at a later time may alone be 
insufficient to prevent retrieval of the memory image.  
Personal Motivation to Alter Autobiographical Belief 
This data supports the perhaps not surprising view that people sometimes do not want to 
believe that certain events occurred. Negative past events are sometimes associated with distress 
when recalled, and the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder is predicated in part on a desire 
to avoid reminders of distressing experiences. Experiences of shame or loss may be actively 
suppressed. The motivation category indicates that people sometimes claim to have succeeded in 
reducing or eliminating belief in events, even while the recollective image remains vivid. 
Although this category is partly reminiscent of work on intentional/directed forgetting of events 
(Anderson & Greene, 2001), and there is some evidence that memory for autobiographical 
events can be intentionally suppressed (Joslyn & Oakes, 2005; Noreen & Macleod, 2013), these 
studies focus on the intentional forgetting of recollective information, whereas our participants 
reported suppressing belief in the event but not recollective information. Theories of intentional 
forgetting will need to account for how belief in the occurrence of events is eliminated, both 
when recollection is and is not also reduced. Future research on events for which people actively 
strive to reduce their belief has the potential to illuminate the role of personal motivation in the 
maintenance and removal of belief from memories. This category points to the need to 
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understand whether, and to what extent, people succeed in eliminating belief, and represents a 
point on the continuum between the forgetting of experiences and the presence of intrusive 
memories that seem resistant to suppression. An important observation is that autobiographical 
belief may be altered due to such motivations, without access to the memory being lost. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 This is the first in depth examination of the reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid 
memories. Key to understanding the results is that, as shown in preceding work, the mental 
simulation for such events remain vivid (highly ‘memory-like’), despite the choice to reduce or 
completely withdraw belief. Respondents provided diverse explanations for such decisions. The 
withdrawal of belief is based on inferential decisions, triggered mainly by external evidence, and 
particularly by social influence. Such evidence can override the power that recollection typically 
holds as incontrovertible evidence that events occurred. This result confirms previous results 
showing that recollection and autobiographical belief are theoretically independent constructs, 
and provides support for the notion that autobiographical belief is influenced by multiple sources 
of information and processes, of which recollection is but one. 
 These findings show that people engage in systematic reasoning to explain why vivid 
memories may not reflect past experiences. As discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Scoboria et 
al., in press), such reasoning stems from the need to reconcile the cognitive dissonance that arises 
from opposing sources of evidence (recollection on one hand, and some other unavoidable, 
contradictory evidence on the other). It is important to note that the development of a 
nonbelieved memory is only one possible outcome of such decision-making processes. In other 
cases the weight assigned to the sense of ‘pastness’ conveyed by the memory is judged to be 
higher than that assigned to the external evidence. In these cases people defend autobiographical 
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belief (Sheen et al., 2001). Retention of belief in light of contradictory evidence might be 
facilitated by the centrality of the memory to the individual’s current sense of identity. It is likely 
that greater resistance is met in changing belief for events that are currently viewed as more 
central for the self, or that are more strongly connected with central self-related themes, as 
suggested by both work on self-consistency (e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2003) and work showing that 
factual belief change is difficult (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997). It is also possible that some 
memories once challenged by credible evidence are rendered inaccessible. This may explain why 
nonbelieved memories comprise a relatively small proportion of autobiographical events (see 
Scoboria & Talarico, 2013, for more on frequency). Nonbelieved memories may be the 
exception rather than the norm when believed memories are challenged; research is needed on 
this issue. A more complete analysis of the revision of autobiographical belief will require 
studying the factors that determine the choice to relinquish vs. the choice to defend the belief that 
memories represent true occurrences, under both naturalistic and laboratory conditions.  
 This paper focuses entirely on subjective appraisals of autobiographical events, and tells 
little if anything about the objective accuracy of the events. As discussed by Mazzoni et al. 
(2010), it is possible that nonbelieved memories reflect accurately ‘disowned’, or inaccurately 
‘orphaned’ memories. However, the accuracy of the accounts examined here is not the focus of 
this work. Rather the aim is to document the reasons to reject, outside of the lab, in real life, an 
existing memory. Future studies will be needed to address the question of the accuracy of the 
initial memory, and evidence from the laboratory studies to date indicates that nonbelieved 
memories can result from both objectively true and objectively false events. 
 We note that it is not known if the current categories are exhaustive. The number of 
categories or frequency of endorsement might differ if individuals were asked to provide more 
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elaborate accounts. Furthermore, people may have tended to report only the most salient reasons. 
It is not clear how well internal categories such as general memory beliefs or internal features are 
captured via this approach. Future research might develop checklists of reasons for altering belief. 
 This study documents the wide variety of reasons that influence the choice to stop 
believing vivid memories. The results underline the key role of external information in memory-
related decisions, and underscore the importance of including social and contextual elements in 
models of remembering. This reinforces claims that judgments of occurrence are based on the 
convergence of numerous memorial and non-memorial numerous sources of information.   
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Table 1. Reasons Provided for Choosing to Withdraw Belief in the Memory 
 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION BRIEF EXAMPLE 
SOCIAL FEEDBACK  Invalidating information is derived via social exchange(s).  
SO1 Told did not occur Feedback that the event did not occur, and/or others deny event. "…told me it didn’t happen.”  
SO2 Told happened differently Feedback that details within the event happened differently. "…told I found out about that differently…” 
SO3 Told impossible Feedback that event could not have occurred. "…said there was no amusement park in that city." 
SO4 Told unlikely Feedback that the event could have occurred but it is unlikely. "…told my teacher wouldn’t have said that..." 
SO5 Told happened to someone else Feedback that the event (or event features) happened to someone else. "…told me that happened to my sister, not me.” 
SO6 Disconfirming non-verbal feedback Intentional non-verbal feedback (e.g., look of disbelief, laughing, etc).  “…they acted like everything was fine.” 
SO7 Told was not there Feedback that was not present to witness event.  "…told me I wasn’t there." 
SO8 Lack of corroboration Feedback provided that the memory cannot be confirmed.  “Nobody else remembers it.” 
SO09 Feedback not sought/provided Does not seek feedback and others do not provide it.  “It was never brought up again”. 
SO10 Others unavailable Does not receive feedback because key other(s) unavailable.  “…she changed her number, so I can’t confirm…” 
SO11 Pressured by others Feedback appears motivated (memory poses consequences for other). “…said he never hurt my sister like I remember.”  
SO12 Refusal to discuss Seeks feedback but other(s) refuse to provide (other may be motivated to avoid). “I tried telling [other], but she refused to talk…" 
EVENT PLAUSIBILITY  Information challenges the possibility that the event could have occurred in reality. 
PL1 Subjective States event is impossible/implausible based on feelings, tastes, or opinions. “It’s impossible for a car to flip like that…" 
PL2 Objective Event judged impossible/implausible for commonly accepted axioms of reality. “…in my memory I am flying!”   
ALTERNATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS  Invalidating information comes from other source attributions that are implied to be confused with reality.  
AA1 Internal, Asleep Memory may have resulted from a dream or nightmare. “It was all just a dream." 
AA2 Internal, Awake Memory may have resulted from fantasy, imagination, etc. “I must have made it up.” 
AA3 Other mental state Memory may have resulted from another cause (hallucination, substance, etc.). “I was really drunk…" 
AA4 External Memory may have resulted from an external source (movie, T.V., book, etc.).  “I actually saw that in a movie." 
GENERAL BELIEFS  Invalidating information relies on general meta-memory attributions  
GB1 Memory and age Belief memories cannot occur when very young or unreliable from childhood. “Children have wild imaginations." 
GB2 Memory integrity Belief in general memory ability, quality of own memory; Beliefs  that memories 
can be false; can result from expectations; should be salient if “important”, etc. 
“If that did happen, I would remember it better." 
GB3 Memory influence Belief that true memories should have an enduring influence. “If I did get bit, I should be afraid of dogs …" 
INTERNAL FEATURES  Invalidating information derived via subjective assessments of internal event characteristics. 
IN1 Atypical internal characteristics Something unusual about memory (features disorganized, feels unreal, etc.). “I can’t remember the details and it seems blurry.” 
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE  Invalidating evidence obtained; validating evidence not obtained (no social exchange).  
EE1 Disconfirming evidence obtained Seeks or confronted with evidence that threatens the validity of the memory.  “I found a group photo and I wasn’t even in it." 
EE2 Confirming evidence not obtained External evidence that validates the memory is absent or cannot be obtained. “If I injured myself, I would have a scar…”   
NOTIONS OF SELF/OTHERS   Invalidating information relies on compatibility between event and one’s concept of self and/or concept of another. 
SO1 (In)consistency w/self-image States event (or features) is at odds with whom they regard themselves to be. “I am a neat freak so there is no way…" 
SO2 (In)consistency w/image of other(s) Sates event (or features) is at odds with the image they hold of other(s). “My mother would never lie to me about that." 
MOTIVATION  Invalidating information is self-derived in wanting to relinquish belief  
MO1 Motivation to relinquish belief Motivated to stop believing confirmatory, or believe disconfirmatory evidence. “I convinced myself it wasn’t real.” 
OTHER  Invalidating information is vague and does not fit into the above categories.  
25 Other   Nonspecific reports.  “I’m just unsure about it." 
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Table 2 
 
Frequency of Major Category Endorsement 
 
Major category 
Frequency of  
mention of  
major category 
 
Frequency of 
major category judged  
as primary reason for  
withdrawing belief 
 
Frequency of 
major category  
endorsed alone 
 
1) Social 198 158 97 
2) Plausibility 132 73 28 
3) Alt. attributions 108 33 13 
4) General beliefs 67 24 6 
5) Internal 61 27 5 
6) Self/Other 45 24 3 
7) External 40 27 6 
8) Motivation 16 4 0 
9) Other* 4 4 4 
 
Total number of times that each major category was mentioned, judged to be the primary reason for withdrawing 
belief, and mentioned alone without additional mention of any other major category. N = 374. *‘Other’ refers to 
vague responses that could not be categorized.  
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Table 3 
 
Frequency of Sub-Category Endorsement 
 
Major category Sub-category 
Frequency of  
mention of  
sub-category 
  
Frequency of 
sub-category judged  
as primary reason for  
withdrawing belief 
 
Frequency of 
sub-category 
 endorsed alone 
 
1) Social Did not occur 78 56 31 
 Happened differently 37 28 18 
 Impossible 28 19 7 
 Unlikely 10 5 1 
 Happened someone else 10 6 5 
 Non-verbal 9 4 2 
 Not present 4 3 1 
 Lack corroboration 46 31 9 
 Not sought 11 5 2 
 Unavailable 2 0 0 
 Pressured 10 1 0 
 Refused 3 0 0 
2) Plausibility Subjective 119 72 10 
 Objective 57 1 1 
3) Alternative 
attributions 
Internal - Asleep 74 22 8 
Internal - Conscious 33 9 4 
Other mental states 12 2 0 
External 4 0 0 
4) General beliefs Memory and age 36 14 4 
 Memory integrity 30 9 2 
 Memory influence 5 1 0 
5) Internal  61 27 5 
6) External Disconfirming obtained 24 17 5 
 Confirming not obtained 17 10 1 
7) Self/Other Self 17 12 2 
 Other 30 12 1 
8) Motivation  16 4 0 
9) Other  4 4 4 
 
Total number of times that each sub-category was mentioned (this is the total number of reasons provided for 
withdrawing belief across all transcripts), judged to be the primary reason for withdrawing belief, and mentioned 
alone without additional mention of any other sub-category. N = 374.  
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Table 4  
 
Overlap Between the Primary Category and the Remaining Major Categories  
 
Primary reason for 
withdrawing belief  
Frequency of 
primary reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Social 158 - 18 26 15 10 4 7 2 
2. Plausibility 73 12 - 25 12 5 4 3 2 
3. Alt. attribution 33 5 9 - 5 5 1 0 3 
4. General beliefs 24 7 5 7 - 6 0 5 1 
5. Internal 27 4 5 8 3 - 2 3 2 
6. External 27 7 11 5 4 2 - 2 0 
7. Self/Other 24 4 10 3 3 5 2 - 2 
8. Motivation 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 - 
 
The table indicates the frequency at which other categories are endorsed, within the category judged as the primary 
reason for withdrawing belief. Because these frequencies are contingent on the number of primary judgments for 
each category, the table is only to be read horizontally. The category identified in the first column is the primary 
reason for withdrawing belief, and reading to the right indicates the number of times each of the other categories 
overlapped with the primary category.  
 
 
 
